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RECENT DECISIONS

standard will be applied in determining whether or not a petition under
section 66.024 will be dismissed. Apparently, if a municipality proceeds under this section rather than section 66.02, some sort of need
for the area to be annexed will have to be shown, in effect as an alternative to the public interest determination required by section 66.02.
In view of the uncertainty as to the meaning of "need" a municipality
would probably be very reluctant to use the annexation procedure of
section 66.024 and would use the consolidation procedure whenever
possible.
Another possible meaning of the term would be that a determination
of the public interest as a whole in the annexation must be made. A
requirement of a determination of the public interest is expressly incorporated in the consolidation statute, section 66.02, and the court
has applied the rule of reason to this statute. 5 The same requirements
of reasonableness, in the sense of not being arbitrary or capricious
and also of being in the public interest, could logically be applied to
annexation under section 66.024. Recognition of the public interest can
be found in the quotations from other jurisdictions that are included
in the Elmwood Park decision, for instance:
And the question of reasonableness is one on the entirety of the
attempted annexation, so that an annexation cannot necessarily
be said to have had a reasonable basis merely because a sound
reason 6may exist for taking in some particular part of the territory.2
This interpretation of the word "need" to mean that an annexation
must be in the public interest would seem to be the most likely interpretation. The legislature has already recognized the importance of
making this determination by including the requirement that proposed
consolidations be submitted to the director of the planning function of
the department of resource development. Also, the continued growth
of urban areas and the need for a sufficient tax base to allow city
governments to provide necessary governmental services to the surrounding area would favor this interpretation. However, so long as
there is ambiguity as to the meaning of the term "need", municipalities
will be very reluctant to proceed under section 66.024.
C.

MICHAEL CONTER

PROBATE: The "Party in Interest" Concepts-In 1948 Ray E.
Helgert executed a simple will by which he left his entire estate to his
two sisters, Rose and Mary Helgert. On February 15, 1963, exactly one
201 (1964) ; Town of Mt. Pleasant v. City of Racme, 24 Wis. 2d 41, 127 N.W.
2d 757 (1964).
'5 Ibid.
16 City of Sugar Creek v. Standard Oil Company, 163 F. 2d 320, 324 (8th Cir.
1947).
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month before he died, Ray Helgert took a pen with red ink and wrote
on the two-page will and its cover. In the case' the court was called
upon to determine whether Mr. Helgert had revoked his will in whole
or part by writing and marking it as he did. However, before the revocation issue could be resolved, the court was required to decide questions of laches and estoppel and to determine the interested parties.
Section 310.045 (1)2 of the Wisconsin Statutes requires that probate
petitions show the interest of the petitioner. Subsection (2)3 of this

statute provides that legatees, devisees, heirs and the surviving spouse
are persons interested in a petition for probate of a will. This subsection further provides that creditors who are not also petitioners are not
interested persons. Section 324.18 requires notification of all persons interested.4
Very practical problems arise when these statutes are read together:
Who has an interest sufficient to be a petitioner for the probate of a
proposed will? When a petition for probate has been made, who has
sufficient interest in the estate to be accorded notice of the proceedings?
Wisconsin case law has often elaborated upon the concept of the party
interested for purposes of petitioning for probate, 5 but the cases seem
peculiarly reticent on the question of party in interest for notice purposes. While paradox may have its reasons, the philosophy that supports silence certainly is of little help to the practicing lawyer who is
confronted with the problem of determining who must be notified of
probate proceedings. It has perhaps always been a wise rule of practice
that if one is in doubt about the interest of an individual, it is best that
he be given notice. This rule works well in cases where all possible inIEstate of Helgert, 29 Wis. 2d 452, 139 N.W. 2d 81 (1965).

§310.045 (1965) :
Petitions to County Court. (1) General. All applications to county courts,
except motions in matters at issue, shall be made by verified petition. All
petitions must show the jurisdiction of the court and the interest of the petitioner. All petitions, except those for statutory certificates or for ex parte
orders in proceedings already pending, shall also show the names and postoffice addresses of all persons interested, so far as known to the petitioner
or ascertainable by him with reasonable diligence; and shall indicate who are
minors or otherwise under disability, and the names and post-office addresses
of their guardians. No defect of form or substance in any petition shall invalidate any proceedings.
3 WIs. STAT. §310.045 (1965):
(2) Probate or Administration. In a petition for probate of a will or for
administration, the legatees and devisees and the surviving spouse and heirs
of the decedent are persons interested. The state is an heir of the decedent
as provided in s. 45.37 (10) and (11) when the decedent was a member of
the Grand Army home for veterans at the time of his death. Creditors who
are not petitioners are not interested persons within the meaning of this
subsection.
4 Wis. Stat. §324.18 (1) (1965).
5 In re Yahn, 258 Wis. 280, 45 N.W. 2d 702 (1951); Hanley v. Kraftczyk, 119
Wis. 352, 96 N.W. 820 (1903); Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Walsh, 87 Wis. 67,
57 N.W. 169 (1894); Will of Rice, 150 Wis. 401, 136 N.W. 956, 137 N.W. 778
(1912) ; Will of Burns, 210 Wis. 499, 246 N.W. 704 (1933).
2 WIS. STAT.
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terested parties have been discovered by analysis of prior wills6 and the
history of the family. It is easy, however, to overlook someone who, at
least arguably, has an interest in the estate. If the petitioner fails to
notify such a person of probate proceedings, that person is not precluded from legal action to force recognition of his interest. 7 Thus a
myriad of problems can arise to plague an estate which to all appearances had long been closed.
The Helgert case presents facts which frighten any lawyer who has
ever wondered if he has notified all the interested parties in a probate
proceeding. Ray Helgert had written many notes and made many markings on the cover and on the margin of his will." The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that he had more than adequately exhibited his intention to revoke his will, and that he had written on its face so as to cancel it entirely.9 The markings that proved most significant were those
which would eventually determine whether his sister Florence had an
interest in the estate.
Mr. Helgert was survived by three daughters and three sisters. At
the time of his death he was living with his three sisters. The testator
had made no provision for his daughters in his will, but left his entire
estate to two of his sisters. Mr. Helgert had written the word "void"
over the attestation clause, but the only other markings on the face of
the will were found on the residuary clause:
All of the rest, residue and remainder of my property and estate,
real and personal, of which I may die seized or possessed, I give,
devise and bequeath unto my sisters, Rose H. Helgert and Mary
E. Helgert, in even and equal proportions, share and share alike,
each of them to receive one-half [/] thereof; unto them, their
heirs and assigns, forever.'0
The trial court held that Florence, a third sister who was not mentioned in the will at all, had no interest sufficient to allow her to offer
the purported will for probate. Further, the trial court held that Florence was barred by laches, and estopped from re-petitioning for the
probate of an instrument which had earlier been held to be revoked.
The supreme court found that Florence had an interest in the estate
sufficient to allow her to present her petition and prove the will, and to
6 Prior wills would need to be analyzed as well as the last will because one who

receives a larger sum under a former will than he would receive under the
last will has been held to be interested in the estate. In re Will of Hunt, 122
Wis. 460, 100 N.W. 874 (1904); 3 PAGE ON WILLS (Bowe-Parker Revision)
§26.54 (1961).
7 O'Dell v. Rogers, 44 Wis. 136 at 169 (1878), where the court said, "The
only form of probate in out practice is the solemn form; of which all parties
interested must have notice, or they are not bound; but the decree is final
and conclusive as to all persons having notice." See also, Heminway v. Reynolds 98 Wis. 501, 74 N.W. 350 (1898).
8 The instrument as executed and marked is fully reproduced in the reports,
Estate of Helgert, 29 Wis. 2d 452, 456-458, 139 N.W. 2d 81, 83-85 (1966).
9 Id. at 463; 139 N.W. 2d 81, 88 (1966).
10 Estate of Helgert, 29 Wis. 2d 452, 456, 139 N.W. 2d 81, 83 (1966).
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this extent the trial court was reversed.' Had Florence been notified
formally of the prior petition for probate of this will, she would have
been precluded from petitioning later?12 Thus, inferentially, the .court
decided that Florence was interested sufficiently so that she should have
been given notice of the prior proceeding wherein probate was denied.
The finding of Florence as an interested party was based on a novel
theory. It was argued by appellants that Wisconsin accepts the doctrine
of partial revocation and thereby the words that were lined out of the
13
residuary clause by the testator were the only words that were revoked.
Without these words the residuary clause would read:
All of the rest, residue and remainder of my property and estate,
real and personal, of which I may die seized or possessed, I give,
devise and bequeath unto my sisters, receive one-half [Y2 ] thereof ; unto them, their heirs and assigns, forever.
Thus-Florence Helgert, being a third sister, could argue that she was a
possible legatee under this construction of the will, and that therefore
she was an interested party for notification and petitioning purposes. 14
The court was thus placed on the horns of a dilemma. They escaped
by looking to the merits of petitioner's case in order to determine
whether she was an interested party; but in so doing, they already assumed that she was a party interested. The court said:
In effect, it is another version of the age-old inquiry of which
came first, the hen or the egg. We eagerly leave this inquiry to
the scientists to settle. It is enough for us to determine here that
under the circumstances of this case the petitioner is an interested
person to present her petition and to have the opportunity to
prove to the court the will giving her an interest in the estate' 5
Though this legal enigma is indeed puzzling, it will be difficult for
lawyers faced with the practical problems of notification to know when
they are safe in denying notice to anyone who has the imaginative
power to argue that he might have an interest in the last or any former
will of the decedent.
The court's decision to recognize Florence as an interested party is
based upon:
the avowed policy of the law to demand 'full and unshackled
inquiry as to the existence, validity, and establishment of wills
and revocations thereof. ' 6
11 Id. at 452, 460, 139 N.W. 2d 81, 86 (1966).
12 Heminway v. Reynolds, 98 Wis. 501, 74 N.W. 350 (1898). Had Florence been
made a party to the probate proceedings by means of notice her only recourse would have been to appeal as a party aggrieved under Wis. STAT.
324.01 (1965).
13 Brief for Appellant, p. 8, Estate of Helgert, 29 Wis. 2d 452, 139 N.W. 2d
81 (1966).
'4 Legatees are interested persons, Wis. STAT. §310.045 (2) (1965).
1 Estate of Helgert, 29 Wis. 2d 452, 459-460, 139 N.W. 2d 81, 86 (1966).
16 Estate of Helgert, 29 Wis. 2d 452, 460, 139 N.W. 2d 81, 86 (1966), quoting Will
of Burns, 210 Wis. 499, 504, 246 N.W. 704 (1933).
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In Wisconsin, unlike most jurisdictions, a man has a constitutional
right to make a will.17 Case law in Wisconsin has recognized as an ele-

mentary principle that a testator has as sacred a right to have his will
put into effect as he had to make it in the first place.
A person having exercised his right to make a will, and done so
in accordance with statutory regulations, has produced a thing
and imposed upon the prospective proponent, the public, and the
court specific duties with reference thereto. The mere beneficiaries are not, in the broad sense, the only parties to it; neither are
they and those who would take in the absence of a will the only
parties concerned, save creditors. Performance of the duty imposed upon the proper person designated by the law to propose
the will for probate may be compelled and nonperformance
thereof punished. The court, having once gained possession of
the res for the purpose of determining its admissibility to probate, is, to all intents and purposes, possessed thereof as the subject of an action in rem. 8
Indeed it seems to be the philosophy of the probate law in Wisconsin to allow nearly anyone but a total stranger to petition for the probate of a purported will. 19
In addition to dispatch in the ultimate determination of those
issues as to testacy or intestacy, the law demands full and unshackled inquiry as to the existence, validity, and establishment
of wills and revocations thereof. That inquiry is not a matter of
interest or concern solely to those who are the beneficiaries under
a will, or the heirs of a testator. We have repeatedly recognized
that 'in the probate of a will the principal question to be deter20
mined is one of status in which the whole world has an interest.'
The concept of the person interested for purposes of petitioning and
the concept of persons interested sufficiently to be notified of a petition
are closely related. As the former expands to encompass more people,
it can be argued that the latter has broadened in scope as well. The
basis for this argument is the fact that a person who has been denied
formal notice of a probate proceeding may very well not be bound by
the result of that proceeding. If the person is later successful in claiming an interest sufficient to allow him to petition, it follows that he
should have been given notice of the original proceedings. Thus, the
broad language of the cases which welcome petitioners to inquire unshackled into the validity of wills, and the cases which readily find a
petitioner interested to petition, seem to expand the concept of the party
sufficiently interested in an estate to be notified.
'171 CALLAGHAN'S WISCONSIN PROBATE LAW, 129 (1959)

§4.40; Wis. CONST.
art. XIV, §13.
Is Will of Rice, 150 Wis. 401, 447-448 136 N.W. 956, 974 (1912).
19 1 CALLAGHAN'S WISCONSIN PROBATE LAW 199 §6.20 (1959); See also 3 PAGE
2 ON WILLS (Bowe-Parker Revision) 81, §26.33 (1961).
0 Will of Bums, 210 Wis. 499, 504, 246 N.W. 704, 706 (1933).
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It seems to the author that the effect of the Helgert decision is to
require attorneys to read section 310.045 (2) to mean that possible legatees, and possible devisees, possible heirs, and any possible surviving
spouse are persons interested. In any case where the attorney is not
positive that he has given formal notice to all possible interested parties,
it seems that he has little alternative but to publish notice of the hearing
to probate a purported will.
THOMAS A. PLEIN

Damages for Pain and Suffering in Wisconsin-In Rivera v.
Wollin the jury awarded the plaintiff four thousand dollars for past
pain and suffering and two thousand dollars for future pain and suffering arising out of an automobile accident. The trial court on motions
after verdict concluded that the damages were above "reasonably debatable amounts" and held that a reasonable amount for past pain and
suffering was three thousand dollars and one thousand dollars for future pain and suffering. The trial court in exercising its power of remittitur gave the plaintiff the option to accept the lower amount or
take a new trial on the issue of damages. The plaintiff accepted the
lower amount. However, the defendant appealed to the supreme court
of Wisconsin contending there was no basis in the record for any award
for future pain and suffering, and that the sum of three thousand dollars for past pain and suffering was still excessive. Thereupon the
plaintiff served a "notice of review" upon the defendant, stating that
the plaintiff would also seek a review by the supreme court of the actions taken by the trial court. The supreme court found that the award
of three thousand dollars for past pain and suffering was not excessive.
But, the court found no basis in the record for any award for future
pain and suffering and therefore held that the lower court should have
remitted the entire two thousand dollar award for future pain and
suffering rather than merely reducing it by one thousand dollars. The
court then gave the plaintiff the option to accept the three thousand
dollar judgment for past pain and suffering or to request a new trial
on the issue of damages.
The jury had originally awarded the plaintiff six thousand dollars
for pain and suffering. The trial court reduced the award to four thousand dollars, and the supreme court finally lowered the judgment to
three thousand dollars.
The expressed foundation for the supreme court's remittitur was
the following rule issued in the landmark case of Diemel v. Weirich:
[W]here the injury is subjective in character and of such a nature that a layman cannot with reasonable certainty know
whether or not there will be future pain and suffering, the courts
'30 Wis. 2d 305, 140 N.W. 2d 748 (1966).

